A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence by Olszewski, Wojciech & Chung, Kim-Sau
Theoretical Economics 2 (2007), 469–487 1555-7561/20070469
A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence
Kim-Sau Chung
Department of Economics, University of Minnesota
and School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong
Wojciech Olszewski
Department of Economics, Northwestern University
We give a sufﬁcient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when
the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a ﬁnite set.
Types are identiﬁed with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements
of this ﬁnite set, and the type space is equipped with the Euclidean topology. Our
sufﬁcient condition is stronger than connectedness but weaker than smooth arc-
wise connectedness. Our result generalizes all existing revenue equivalence theo-
rems when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over
a ﬁnite set. When the set of social alternatives is ﬁnite, we provide a necessary
and sufﬁcient condition. This condition is similar to, but slightly weaker than,
connectedness.
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1. Introduction
Revenue equivalence has long intrigued economists. In certain settings, a broad range
of mechanisms, including ﬁrst- and second-price auctions, collect exactly the same ex-
pected revenue. This fact has led economists to try to delineate the conditions under
which revenue equivalence holds.
In a number of recent papers, several authors provide sufﬁcient conditions for rev-
enue equivalence (see, for example, Krishna and Maenner 2001, Milgrom and Segal
2002 and Ely 2001).1 One common feature of these sufﬁcient conditions is that they
are stated with reference to some topological and linear structures on the agents’ type
spaces, which are not deﬁned in terms of the basic primitives of the mechanism design
problem. This feature is undesirable because revenue equivalence is stated in terms of
the basic primitives of the mechanism design problem. If a social choice function sat-
isﬁes revenue equivalence, it does so regardless of whether the agents’ type spaces are
equipped with any extra structure, and regardless of the nature of any such structure.
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In this paper, we look for sufﬁcient (and sometimes necessary) conditions that can
bestatedwithoutreferringtoanyextratopologicalorlinearstructures. Wetakeasprim-
itives only arbitrary sets of types for the agents, an arbitrary set of social alternatives,
and valuation functions that assign numbers to each type–alternative pair. Types can be
identiﬁed with real-valued functions that assign valuations to social alternatives. Our
main result, Theorem 1, is a sufﬁcient condition when the set of social alternatives con-
sists of probability distributions over a ﬁnite set; this condition is weaker than smooth
arcwise connectedness, but stronger than connectedness. The result generalizes all ex-
istingrevenueequivalencetheoremswhenthesetofsocialalternativesconsistsofprob-
abilitydistributionsoveraﬁniteset. Moreover, ourproofiselementary, inthesensethat
it does not refer to the concepts of differentiation or to any envelope theorem. However,
we offer no insight for general sets of social alternatives.
When the set of social alternatives is ﬁnite, we provide a necessary and sufﬁcient
conditioninTheorem4; thisconditioniscloseto, butweakerthanconnectednessofthe
type space in the Euclidean topology on real-valued functions. It seems to be of interest
because, although it has long been folk wisdom that (some deﬁnition of) connected-
ness is intimately related to revenue equivalence, it clariﬁes the exact relation between
the two. We also give a (similar) sufﬁcient condition, which is also weaker than connect-
edness, when the set of social alternatives has cardinality lower than continuum.
Although our motivation is rather theoretical, we demonstrate that our results are
relevant for some applications. We see two ways in which our results may be applied.
Firstly, they seem useful in models with a mixed continuous–discrete type space;2 we
exhibit such an application in Example 1. Secondly, the existing sufﬁcient conditions
for revenue equivalence impose some assumptions that may be violated in some appli-
cations (e.g., the convexity assumed by Krishna and Maenner). Authors studying more
general classes of mechanism design problems may prefer not to impose them (e.g., the
absolute continuity assumed in Milgrom and Segal is not very elegant and, typically, has




agents. Many applications (including auctions) require more agents. The results for the
many-agentcasefollowfairlyeasilyfromtheresultsfortheone-agentcase. LetS denote
the type space and let A denote the set of social pure alternatives. Let A denote the set
of all probability distributions over the set A with ﬁnite support. Let F be an arbitrary
subset of A. The agent has a type-dependent and quasi-linear utility function of the
form
v(s,a) t,
2Mixed type spaces seem to be of interest as some variables are typically modeled as continuous (e.g.
consumption, wealth, and input prices), whereas others naturally are, or are modeled as, discrete (e.g.
cohort, or ability). We thank a referee for this (and several other) arguments regarding applications.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Revenue equivalence 471
where s is the agent’s type, a is the implemented social alternative, and t is a (possibly
negative) monetary transfer made by the agent. She is an expected utility maximizer.
For simplicity, we denote by v(s,) the expected value of the function v(s,a) when the
social alternative is implemented according to the probability distribution  2 A. The
triple (S,F,v) deﬁnes a mechanism design problem. We thus regard the triple as the
primitive of the problem.
A social choice function (SCF) is a mapping f :S ! F and a transfer rule is a mapping
t :S ! R. This formulation includes the special case of F = A, which rules out random-
ization. In Section 3 we assume that F = A and the set A is ﬁnite, and in Section 5.4,
we assume that F = A and the cardinality of A is lower than continuum.3 A mecha-
nism is a pair (f ,t), where f is an SCF and t is a transfer rule. A mechanism is incentive
compatible if for any types s, s0 2S,
v(s, f (s)) t(s)v(s, f (s0)) t(s0).
AnSCF f isincentivecompatible ifthereexistsatransferrulet suchthatthemechanism
(f ,t) is incentive compatible.
An incentive compatible SCF f satisﬁes the revenue equivalence property if for any
twoincentivecompatiblemechanisms(f ,t)and(f ,t 0)thereexistsaconstantc 2R such
that
8s2S t 0(s)=t(s)+c.
We now deﬁne a topology on the type space. We assume that there exist no types s
and s0 such that v(s,a)=v(s0,a) for every a 2A. We can make this assumption without
loss of generality, as for every type space S there exists a subspace S0  S such that for
every s 2S there exists exactly one s0 2S0 such that v(s,a)=v(s0,a) for every a 2A, and
it is easy to check that for all spaces S and S0, every incentive compatible SCF f :S ! F
satisﬁes the revenue equivalence property if and only if every incentive compatible SCF
f :S0 ! F satisﬁes the revenue equivalence property.
We consider the sup-norm in the type spaceS, i.e. the distance between any pair of




one can easily check that S equipped with this distance is a metric space.4 In other
words, we ﬁrst identify types with real-valued functions f 2RA that assign valuations to
socialalternatives,andthenweequipthefunctionspaceRA withthesup-norm. Wepre-
fer not to identify types explicitly with real-valued functions f 2 RA, and deﬁne instead
the distance between types by formula (1) in order to maintain the notational conven-
tions of standard textbooks. For ﬁnite sets A, we could equivalently equip RA with any
other norm, as any two norms on a Euclidean space are equivalent; in Section 3 where
3An alternative formulation of our results is that F from Section 5.4 is an arbitrary subset of A, whose
cardinality is lower than continuum, and F from Section 3 is an arbitrary subset of A, where A is ﬁnite.
4It is important here that there exist no types s and s0 such that v(s,a) = v(s0,a) for every a 2 A, as it
guarantees that dist(s,s0)=0 implies s =s0.472 Chung and Olszewski Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
we study ﬁnite sets A, it proves convenient to use the equivalent L1-norm, in which the





The following example exhibits a mechanism design problem in which the type
space differs from the ones considered in the existing literature on revenue equivalence.
Example 1. Consider a principal hiring an agent to perform one of two tasks. The cost
c1 = p of performing task 1 is determined by the market price p, which takes values in
theinterval(0,1). Thecostc2 =d p ofperformingtask2isdeterminedbyboththeinput
price p and the agent’s ability d 2f0,1,2g (which takes one of three levels).
Suppose that the agent knows both d and p, while the principal does not know ei-
ther. The principal can be thought of choosing between which of the two (possibly un-
related) tasks she should assign the agent to. She can assign the agent to task 1 (in which
case the relevant private information is c1), or to task 2 (in which case the relevant pri-
vateinformationisc2). Acontractcanbemodeledas arevelationmechanismwherethe
agent reports a type (d,p) and the mechanism assigns a task and speciﬁes a wage.
Notice that the valuation of being assigned to task 1 is equal to  c1 =  p, while the
valuation of being assigned to task 2 is equal to  c2 =  d p. Thus, we identify the type




f(v1,v2):v1 2( 1,0) and v2 =d v1 gR2.
This set is a “fan” consisting of three disjoint segments, and one can easily imagine sim-
ilar applications in which the setS may be topologically quite complicated. 
3. High-cardinality sets of alternatives
In this section, we assume F =A for a ﬁnite set A. This case covers a number of impor-
tant applications of mechanism design, including auctions of multiple units of indivis-
ible objects. (This application requires more agents, but, as we show in Section 5.4, the
result for many agents follows fairly easily from the result for the one-agent case.) Our
main result provides a sufﬁcient condition for the type space that guarantees that every
incentive compatible SCF satisﬁes the revenue equivalence property.
Definition 1. (i) A metric spaceS is gridwise connected between points s and s0 if
8">0 9s=s0,...,sn=s0 8i=1,...,n dist(si,si 1)<".




then the setS is boundedly gridwise connected between points s and s0.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Revenue equivalence 473
(iii) A metric space S is gridwise connected (respectively, boundedly gridwise con-
nected) if it is gridwise connected (respectively, boundedly gridwise connected)
between any points s, s0 2S.
Connectedness implies gridwise connectedness, and if the metric space S is com-
pact, the two concepts are equivalent (see Engelking 1989, Chapter 6, Exercise 6.1.D).
Arcwise connectedness (called also, by some authors, pathwise connectedness) does
not imply bounded gridwise connectedness; for example, the graphs of some contin-
uous but nowhere differentiable functions (see, for instance, Billingsley 1982) have the
former but not the latter property. However, smooth arcwise connectedness implies
bounded gridwise connectedness as any pair of points of a smooth arcwise connected
space can be connected by an arc of ﬁnite length. On the other hand, bounded gridwise
connectedness does not imply arcwise connectedness, even in the realm of compact
spaces (see Engelking 1989, Chapter 6, Exercise 6.1.G).
Finally, it is immediate to verify that the set S in Example 1 is boundedly gridwise
connected.
Theorem 1. Suppose that F = A for a ﬁnite set A. If the type space S is boundedly grid-
wise connected, then every incentive compatible SCF f :S ! F satisﬁes the revenue equiv-
alence property.
To prove this result we need the following notation. For any pair of vectorsx, y 2RA,
we denote by x y their inner (or scalar) product. For a SCF f : S ! A, every f (s) is
a vector of probabilities assigned to all alternatives, and so it is an element of RA; also,
every v(s,) is an element of RA. We can therefore consider the product of the vectors
f (s) and v(s,).
Lemma 1. (i) For every incentive compatible SCF f and any types s, s0 2S,
v(s,)





f (s)  f (s0)

. (2)
(ii) Suppose that s = s0, ..., sn = s0 2S. Let (f ,t 0) and (f ,t 00) be incentive compatible









f (si)  f (si 1)

. (3)
Proof. (i) By incentive compatibility,
v(s,) f (s) t(s)v(s,) f (s0) t(s0)
and
v(s0,) f (s0) t(s0)v(s0,) f (s) t(s).




















































































This yields (3) for s =s0 and s0 =sn. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that (f ,t 0) and (f ,t 00) are incentive compatible. Take a
pair of points s, s0 2 S. We show that t 0(s) = t 00(s) implies t 0(s0) = t 00(s0). That is, if two
transfer rules coincide at one point, they coincide at every other point. This obviously
implies that any two t and t 0 transfer rules differ by a constant, because if (f ,t) is incen-





for a ﬁxed s 2S. Thus, t 0(s0) = t 00(s0), and so t 0(s0) = t(s0)+c where c = [t 0(s) t(s)], for
every s0 2S.
The proof applies the following idea: By assumption, there exists a sequence of
points s = s0, ..., sn = s0 with the property that each si is within the distance " of its
predecessor. If the number of points in this sequence were bounded by a number inde-
pendent of ", Theorem 1 would follow immediately from (3); indeed, each coordinate of
the term [si  si 1] can be made as small as we wish, and each coordinate of the term 
f (si)  f (si 1)

is bounded by 1. However, the number of points in the sequence s =s0,
..., sn = s0 is typically not bounded by a number independent of ". We therefore pick a
subsequence from the sequence s = s0, ..., sn = s0 whose number of points is bounded
by a number that depends only on the number of alternatives in A. By picking such a
subsequence, we typically lose the property that each si is within the distance " of si 1.
However, we can pick our subsequence in such a way that whenever si is not within the
distance  of si 1, f (si) is as close as we wish to f (si 1).







, (4)Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Revenue equivalence 475
and so (as k can be arbitrary large)
t 0(s)=t 00(s)=)t 0(s0)=t 00(s0).
To show (4) take s = s0, ..., sn = s0 2 S satisfying Deﬁnition 1 (i) for " = 1=km+1
where m denotes the number of elements of A. Represent the simplex A  [0,1]m as
theunionofkm cubesPi suchthatanytwoprobabilityvectorsp,q 2Pi differatmostby





for every j =1,...,m.
We now pick a sequence sFIRST
0 , sLAST
0 , ..., sFIRST
N , sLAST
N consisting of the elements
of the sequence s0,...,sn as follows. Take sFIRST
0 = s0, and then take any Pi0 such that
f (sFIRST
0 ) 2 Pi0; let sLAST
0 be the last element of s0,...,sn with the property that f (sLAST
0 ) 2
Pi0. Next, take as sFIRST
1 the successor of sLAST
0 in the sequence s0,...,sn, and take any
Pi1 such that f (sFIRST
1 ) 2 Pi1; as in the ﬁrst step, let sLAST






N =sn is deﬁned.
























































































































































j are consecutive elements of the sequence s0,...,sn, the distance



































































Recall that a homeomorphism of metric (or topological) spaces is a continuous one-
to-oneandontomappingwhoseinverseisalsocontinuous. Asubset J ofametricspace
is called an arc if it is homeomorphic to the unit interval [0,1], i.e. there exists a homeo-



















provided that the limit (5) exists and is independent of the choice of xn
0 ,...,xn
n.
An arc is called smooth if there exists a differentiable parameterization j : [0,1] ! J
whose derivatives are continuous. The length of any smooth arc is well-deﬁned and
ﬁnite, but there exist arcs with well-deﬁned and ﬁnite length that are not smooth. The-
orem 1 implies immediately the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose that F = A for a ﬁnite set A. Every incentive compatible SCF
satisﬁes the revenue equivalence property whenever the type space S satisﬁes one of the
following conditions.
(i) Any pair of points s, s0 2S can be connected by an arc of ﬁnite length.
(ii) Any pair of points s, s0 2S can be connected by a smooth arc.
Since any pair of points of a connected open set U  RA can be connected by a
smooth arc, Corollary 1 yields the following result.
Corollary 2. Suppose that F = A for a ﬁnite set A, and the type space S  RA is a
connected open set, or it contains a connected, open, and dense set. Then every incentive
compatible SCF satisﬁes the revenue equivalence property.
Finally note that in the special case in which A consists of only two elements, con-
nectedness of the type spaceS is a sufﬁcient condition for revenue equivalence.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Revenue equivalence 477
Proposition 1. Suppose that F = A for a two-element set A. If the type space S  RA is
connected,theneveryincentivecompatibleSCFsatisﬁestherevenueequivalenceproperty.
Proof. Let f :S !A be an incentive compatible SCF. Denote by p(s) the probability
assigned by f (s) to the ﬁrst alternative. Let :S !R be given by
8s=(s1,s2) (s)=s2  s1.
Takeanys,s0 2S. Fix" >0. Supposethat(s)(s0);theoppositecaseisanalogous.




By Lemma 1 (ii), for any transfer rules t 0 and t 00 such that (f ,t 0) and (f ,t 00) are incen-

























By Lemma 1 (i),
[si  si 1]






















Since this inequality holds for every " >0, we obtain that t 0(s0)=t 00(s0). 
Proposition 1 is of particular relevance to auctions with a single indivisible object.
In these auctions, for every typical bidder, there are only two payoff relevant outcomes:
whether she gets the object, or not. We show in Section 5.4 that Proposition 1 for many
agents follows fairly easily from the one-agent case. Hence revenue equivalence is guar-
anteed as long as every bidder’s type space is connected, which is weaker than the as-
sumption of Theorem 1.478 Chung and Olszewski Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
4. Comparison to existing literature
The early literature on revenue equivalence is concerned with the uniqueness of Groves
mechanisms. The earliest paper we are aware of is Green and Laffont (1977), which
shows that for an arbitrary set of social alternatives F equipped with a topology, if the
type space S contains all continuous (or all u.s.c.) valuation functions, then all efﬁcient
SCFs satisfy the revenue equivalence property.
Walker (1978) considers a set F that is a subset of an Euclidean space. He shows
that if (i) an efﬁcient SCF f has a convex range, (ii) S contains only concave valuation
functions, and (iii) S is rich enough that for any a, a0 2 A, and for any gradient, we can
ﬁnd a valuation function inS that has this gradient at a, and is arbitrarily close to linear
between a and a0, then the efﬁcient SCF f satisﬁes the revenue equivalence property.
These two results take a form quite different from the results in the rest of the literature,
including ours (e.g. even the set of social alternatives is equipped with a topological or
linear structure that is not deﬁned in terms of the basic primitives of the mechanism
design problem), and hence a direct comparison is difﬁcult.
Holmström (1979) shows that for an arbitrary set F, ifS is (piecewise) smoothly con-
nected with respect to an efﬁcient SCF f , then the SCF f satisﬁes the revenue equiva-
lence property. He callsS smoothly connected with respect to f if, for any s, s0 2S, there
is an arc J inS, parameterized by j :[0,1]! J, such that j(0)=s, j(1)=s0,
@ v(j(y),a)
@ y











for all a 2 f (J) and y.
Notice that Holmström’s concern is the revenue equivalence property of speciﬁc
SCFs, and this explains why his condition is stated in terms of both the type space and
the SCF. A similar feature can be found in several subsequent results as well. For exam-
ple, Williams (1999) shows that for an arbitrary set F, for any incentive compatible SCF
f , ifS is a connected open subset of the Euclidean space, and if v(s, f (s0)) as a function
of (s,s0) is differentiable at points that satisfy s =s0, then the SCF f satisﬁes the revenue
equivalence property.5
The way we pose the revenue equivalence question in this paper is slightly different:
we ask when it is the case that all incentive compatible SCFs satisfy the revenue equiv-
alence property. This way of posing the question is motivated more by the mechanism
design literature. If we require the assumptions of Holmström or Williams to hold for all
incentive compatible SCFs simultaneously, then their results follow from the ﬁrst part
of our Corollary 2 (assuming, of course, that F =A for a ﬁnite set A).
5Although Williams states his result only for efﬁcient SCFs, his proof does not rely on efﬁciency, and
hence we state his result in this more general way.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Revenue equivalence 479
In the mechanism design literature, economists usually ﬁnd it convenient to work
with a type space where all incentive compatible SCFs satisfy the revenue equivalence
property. Inauctionsettings,Myerson(1981),andsubsequentlyJehieletal.(1999),show
that when F = A with A ﬁnite, if S is a “rectangular” subset of RA, then all incentive
compatible SCFs satisfy the revenue equivalence property. Their results follow immedi-
ately from our Theorem 1.
Two other papers provide results similar to our Theorem 1. Krishna and Maenner
show the following result (see their Proposition 1).
Theorem 2 (Krishna and Maenner 2001). Suppose that S is an open and convex subset
of Rn, and for every social alternative a, the function v is convex with respect to s. Then
every incentive compatible SCF satisﬁes the revenue equivalence property.6
This theorem follows from our Theorem 1 when the set of social alternatives is a
subset of A for a ﬁnite set A. Indeed, it is easy to see that it sufﬁces to derive their
result from Theorem 1 when S is an open interval. If, however, S is an open interval,
then any convex real-valued function deﬁned on S is continuous; moreover, it satisﬁes
the Lipschitz condition on every closed interval R S, i.e.
8a2F 9M>0 8s,s02R jv(s,a) v(s0,a)jM js  s0j.
Thus the sufﬁcient condition in Theorem 1 is satisﬁed when S is an open interval and
the function v is convex with respect to s.
Milgrom and Segal show the following result (see their Corollary 1).
Theorem 3 (Milgrom and Segal 2002). Suppose that S = [0,1]; suppose further that the















is integrable on [0,1]. Then every incentive compatible SCF satisﬁes the revenue equiva-
lence property.7
This theorem follows immediately from our Theorem 1 when the set of social alter-
nativesisasubsetofA foraﬁnitesetA. Toseethis, observethattheintegrabilityofthe
functiongivenby(8)impliestheintegrabilityof(@ v=@ s)(s,a)foreverysocialalternative
a, which in turn implies that any pair of points inS can be connected by an arc of ﬁnite
length.8
6Krishna and Maenner do not explicitly assume in their Proposition 1 thatS is open, but it is clear from
their proof that they make this assumption. Actually, their result fails when S is not open; an example is
availableinasupplementaryﬁleonthejournalwebsite,http://econtheory.org/supp/277/supplement.pdf.
7Milgrom and Segal allow for other than quasi-linear utility speciﬁcations; here, we formulate their the-
orem only for quasi-linear utilities.
8In their footnote 10, Milgrom and Segal point out that the integrability assumption can be somewhat
relaxed for quasi-linear utilities. One can easily show that their weaker assumption is also stronger than
our sufﬁcient condition in Theorem 1.480 Chung and Olszewski Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
On the other hand, we assume in Theorem 1 that the set of social alternatives is a
subset of A for a ﬁnite set A; both Krishna and Maenner and Milgrom and Segal do not
make any assumptions on the set of social alternatives. These two papers also prove a






where the integration takes places over an arc joining s and s0.
5. Concluding comments
5.1 A discussion of the sufﬁcient condition in Theorem 1
The sufﬁcient condition in Theorem 1 is not necessary for the revenue equivalence
property (even in the realm of connected type spaces). Let S1 be the segment f(x,y) 2





further let S =S1 [S2. It can be shown that S is not boundedly gridwise connected; yet
every incentive compatible SCF f :S ! A, when F = A for a ﬁnite set A, satisﬁes the
revenue equivalence property.
We do not know if there exist connected type spaces S without the revenue equiva-
lence property. It can be shown that if a type space S does not have the revenue equiv-
alence property, then it contains a subspace S0 S that is not boundedly gridwise con-
nected between any pair of points s, s0 2 S0; the graphs of continuous but nowhere
differentiable functions (see, for instance, Billingsley 1982), and some straightforward
modiﬁcations thereof, are the only examples of connected spaces with this property of
which we are aware.
5.2 Arbitrary sets of alternatives
We know rather little about any sufﬁcient (and “close” to necessary) conditions for rev-
enue equivalence when A is an arbitrary set of social alternatives. On the one hand,
Krishna and Maenner (2001) as well as Milgrom and Segal (2002) provide some sufﬁ-
cient conditions, but their conditions are driven by a particular method of proving the
revenue equivalence theorem, and we have rather little sense if they are close to neces-
saryconditions. Ontheotherhand,Holmström(1979)andEly(2001)giveanexamplein
which revenue equivalence fails; in their example, S = A = [0,1], v(s,a) is a continuous
(and piecewise linear) function, and the type space equipped with the distance given by
formula (1) is boundedly gridwise connected.
5.3 A two-step approach to optimal mechanism design
In the literature on mechanism design, the environment is often deliberately set up so
that all incentive compatible SCFs satisfy the revenue equivalence property. This al-
lows us to decompose the procedure of ﬁnding the optimal mechanism into two steps:Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Revenue equivalence 481
In step 1, we look for the cheapest (from the mechanism designer’s perspective) mech-
anisms implementing incentive compatible SCFs by shifting the transfer rule upwards
untiltheindividualrationalityconstraintsbind. Instep2,wemaximizeoverallincentive
compatible SCFs, taking into account the implementation costs. Revenue equivalence
guarantees that step 1 can be done independently of the principal’s beliefs over the type
space, her risk preferences, etc.; this is so because all transfer rules are linearly ranked.
The following proposition says that the two-step approach does not lose much of its
applicability even when revenue equivalence fails. To state the result we need to deﬁne
individual rationality. Let r : S ! R be the agent’s state-dependent reservation utility
function. An incentive-compatible mechanism (f ,t) is individually rational if
8s2S v(s, f (s)) t(s)r(s).
Proposition 2. For every incentive compatible SCF f , there exists a unique cheapest
(from the mechanism designer’s perspective) individually rational mechanism (f ,t ), in
the sense that for any individually rational mechanism (f ,t), we have t (s)  t(s) for
every s 2S.
Proof. Let
8s2S t (s)=supft(s):(f ,t) is incentive compatible and individually rationalg.
If (f ,t ) were not incentive compatible, then there would exist s, s0 2S such that
v(s, f (s)) t (s)<v(s, f (s0)) t (s0).
Therefore, by the deﬁnition of t , there would exist also an incentive compatible mech-
anism (f ,t) such that
v(s, f (s)) t(s)<v(s, f (s0)) t (s0),
but, again by the deﬁnition of t ,
v(s, f (s0)) t (s0)v(s, f (s0)) t(s0),
which contradicts the incentive compatibility of (f ,t). 
5.4 Many agents
Throughout this paper we have considered a single agent. Notice, however, that all our
resultsextendeasilytothecaseofmoreagents,asfollows. Considern agents;eachagent
i learns a signal si 2Si. Agent i has a state-dependent utility function over alternatives
vi :S A !R, whereS =S1 Sn, and a quasi-linear utility with respect to transfers.
Suppose that there is a single common prior probability distribution over types.9 Given
any type si 2Si, the expected value of the function vi over the opponents’ signal proﬁles
s i 2 S i maps A into R, so that each type si can be identiﬁed with an element of the
space RA.
9The assumption of a common prior is obviously restrictive.482 Chung and Olszewski Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Now, given any condition on the single-agent type space that guarantees revenue
equivalence (in the case of a single agent), we obtain a condition for revenue equiva-
lence in the case of many agents by requiring the single-agent condition to be satisﬁed
foreveryagenti =1,...,n whenweusetheexpectedvaluesofvi toidentifytypessi with
elements of RA.
This extension of our results does, however, have a limitation, which may not be
immediately apparent. Recall that in the single-agent case we deﬁne SCFs and transfer
rules as mappings of the reported type s, and all our results should be read with these
deﬁnitions in mind. For multi-agent extensions, these deﬁnitions imply that, given
truthful reporting by the other agents, the action expected by player i and her expected
transfer can depend only on the type reported by player i, but not on her actual type.
This condition is immediately satisﬁed when types are independent, but is typically vi-
olated when types are correlated across agents.
We do not differ here from the existing literature, which (like Milgrom and Segal
2002) restricts attention to the single-agent case, or (like Krishna and Maenner 2001)
treats the many-agent case in a similar manner to the present paper. In particular, our
extension of Theorem 1 to many agents still generalizes the many-agent version of the
theorem from Krishna and Maenner quoted in Section 4 when F =A for a ﬁnite set A.
Appendix: Low-cardinality sets of alternatives
Consider now the case when F = A is ﬁnite. Our result in this section provides a nec-
essary and sufﬁcient condition on the type space that guarantees that every incentive
compatible SCF satisﬁes the revenue equivalence property. If the set A is inﬁnite, but
has cardinality lower than continuum, our theorem provides only a sufﬁcient condition.
Recall that a topological spaceS is connected if it cannot be represented as the union of
two disjoint, non-empty open sets. Our sufﬁcient (and necessary) condition says thatS
cannot be represented as the union of two disjoint, non-empty open sets of a particu-
lar form. To state our theorem precisely we need some notation. Given a pair B1, B2 of























Notice that, given B1, B2  A, r : B1 [ B2 ! R, and " > 0, the sets V1(") and V2("), as
well as V1 and V2, are disjoint. Notice also that the sets V1 and V2 are open. Indeed, if
s 2 Vi(") for some " > 0, then it is easy to see that
S
">0Vi(") contains the ball around s
with radius "=3 in the metric given by (1). If the set A is ﬁnite, then also the sets V1(") and
V2(") are open.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Revenue equivalence 483
Theorem 4. (i) Suppose that the set F =A is ﬁnite. Then every incentive compatible SCF
satisﬁes the revenue equivalence property if and only if there exist no disjoint sets
B1, B2   A, a function r : B1 [ B2 ! R, and " > 0 such that S  V1(")[V2(") and
V1(")\S 6=?6=V2(")\S.
(ii) Suppose that the set F =A has cardinality lower than the continuum (but need not
be ﬁnite). If there exist no disjoint sets B1, B2   A, and a function r : B1 [ B2 ! R
such that S  V1 [V2 and V1 \S 6= ? 6= V2 \S, then every incentive compatible SCF
satisﬁes the revenue equivalence property.
Proof. (i, =)): To the contrary suppose there exist B1, B2   A, r : B1 [ B2 ! R, and




take any a 2 B1 [ B2 that maximizes [v(s,a) r(a)] in the case of multiplicity. Deﬁne
also a transfer rule t :S !R by
t(s)=r(a) if f (s)=a.
By deﬁnition, (f ,t) is an incentive compatible mechanism.
Now deﬁne t 0 :S !R by
t 0(s)=
(
t(s)+"=2 if s 2V1(")
t(s) "=2 if s 2V2(").
(10)
Since S  V1(") [ V2(") and V1(") \ V2(") = ?, the transfer rule t 0 is well-deﬁned; since
V1(")\S 6= ? 6= V2(")\S, the difference t  t 0 is not a constant function. It remains to
show that (f ,t 0) is an incentive compatible mechanism, which reduces to showing that
the agent of any type s 2V1(") cannot proﬁtably deviate by reporting a type s0 2V2(").
By deﬁnition, s 2V1(") implies that
9b12B1 8b22B2 v(s,b1) v(s,b2)>r(b1) r(b2)+",
i.e. the agent prefers by at least " some alternative b1 2 B1 and the transfer r(b1) to any
alternativeb2 2 B2 and the transfer r(b2); in particular, f (s)2 B1. By a similar argument,
s0 2 V2(") implies that f (s0) 2 B2. The two arguments together imply that the agent of
any type s 2 V1 prefers the alternative f (s) and the transfer t 0(s) to the alternative f (s0)
and the transfer t 0(s0).
(i, (=): Suppose that there exist incentive compatible mechanisms (f ,t) and (f ,t 0)
such that the difference t  t 0 is not a constant function. Let
S(a)= f  1(a)
fora 2A. Noticethatt,t 0,andsot  t 0,areconstantfunctionsoneveryS(a),asforevery
s 2S(a) the agent has an incentive to report the element of S(a) that minimizes t or t 0.484 Chung and Olszewski Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Thus, t  t 0 takes only a ﬁnite number of values, and so there exists a real number (say r)
and " >0 such that the values of t  t 0 belong to the union of two intervals, ( 1,r  2")
and (r +",1), and each interval contains at least one value.
Denote by B1 the set of all alternatives b1 such that (t   t 0)(s) 2 ( 1,r   2") for
s 2 S(b1), and by B2 the set of all alternatives b2 such that (t   t 0)(s) 2 (r + ",1) for
s 2S(b2). Note that B1[B2 is equal to the range of f , which obviously need not be equal
to the entire A. Deﬁne, ﬁnally,
8b12B1 r(b1)=t(s)+", where s 2S(b1)
8b22B2 r(b2)=t(s) ", where s 2S(b2).
Picking B1, B2, r : B1 [ B2 ! R and " > 0, we have deﬁned the sets V1(") and V2("). We






which obviously implies thatS V1(")[V2(") and V1(")\S 6=?6=V2(")\S.
Consider s1 2S(b1) where b1 2 B1. Then, by incentive compatibility,
8b22B2 8s22S(b2) v(s1,b1) t 0(s1)v(s1,b2) t 0(s2),
or
v(s1,b2) v(s1,b1)t 0(s2) t 0(s1).
By deﬁnition, (t  t 0)(s1)<r  2" and (t  t 0)(s2)>r +", and the three inequalities imply
that
v(s1,b2) v(s1,b1)<t(s2) t(s1) 3".
Since r(b1) = t(s1)+" for every s1 2 S(b1), and r(b2) = t(s2) " for every s2 2 S(b2)




which means that s1 2V1(").
Now consider s2 2S(b2) where b2 2 B2. Then, by incentive compatibility,
8b12B1 8s12S(b1) v(s2,b2) t(s2)v(s2,b1) t(s1). (12)
The left-hand side of this inequality is equal to
v(s2,b2) t(s2)=v(s2,b2) r(b2) "
and the right-hand side is equal to
v(s2,b1) t(s2)=v(s2,b1) r(b1)+" >v(s2,b1) r(b1).Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Revenue equivalence 485
Thus, inequality (12) implies that
8b12B1 v(s2,b2) r(b2)>v(s2,b1) r(b1)+", (13)
which means that s2 2V2(").
(ii) Suppose that there exist incentive compatible mechanisms (f ,t) and (f ,t 0) such
that the difference t  t 0 is not a constant function. Let
S(a)= f  1(a)
for a 2A. By an argument similar to (i, (=), there exists a real number (say r) such that
the values of t  t 0 belong to the union of two intervals, ( 1,r) and (r,1), and each of
the two intervals contains at least one value.
Denote by B1 the set of all alternatives b1 such that (t  t 0)(s)2( 1,r) for s 2S(b1),
and by B2 the set of all alternativesb2 such that (t  t 0)(s)2(r,1) for s 2S(b2). For every
b1 2 B1 take any " >0 such that 2" <r  (t  t 0)(s) for s 2S(b1), and deﬁne
r(b1)=t(s)+".
Similarly, for every b2 2 B2 take any " > 0 such that " < (t  t 0)(s) r for s 2 S(b2), and
deﬁne
r(b2)=t(s) ".
By an argument similar to (i, (=), if s1 2S(b1) where b1 2 B1 then (11) holds for " corre-







which in turn yieldsS V1 [V2 and V1 \S 6=?6=V2 \S. 
Remark. The sufﬁcient condition in part (ii) is stronger (for inﬁnite sets A) than the
necessary and sufﬁcient condition in part (i), and part (ii) (for inﬁnite A) does not hold
under the weaker condition in (i).
There are several problems with modifying the proof of (i, =)) to obtain the con-
verse of (ii). First, formula (9) does not deﬁne a SCF as there may be no a 2 B1 [ B2 that
maximizes [v(s,a) r(a)]. But even if such an a exists for every s, formula (10) does not
typically yield a t 0 such that (f ,t 0) is incentive compatible (no matter what " we pick),
unless we assume the stronger condition in (i) instead of that in (ii). That formula does
notguaranteethattheagentoftypes 2Vi cannotproﬁtablydeviatebyreportinganother
type s0 that belongs to the same Vi.
We suspect that the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for inﬁnite A has to be much
more complicated than the condition in Theorem 4.
The following argument demonstrates that the necessary and sufﬁcient condition
in Theorem 4 can be easily veriﬁed for the mechanism design problem described in
Example 1 (and in practice, for all mechanism design problems with only two social
alternatives).486 Chung and Olszewski Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Example 1 continued. The condition in Theorem 4 is violated if there exist disjoint sets
B1, B2  A, a function r : B1[B2 !R, and " >0 such thatS V1(")[V2(") and V1(")\S 6=
? 6= V2(") \S. Any such sets B1, B2 must be singletons. Therefore, letting B1 = fb1g,
B2 =fb2g, and r =r(b1) r(b2),
V1(")=f(v1,v2):v1  v2 >r +"g
and
V2(")=f(v1,v2): v1  v2 <r  "g.
That is, V1(") consists of points lying below an "-neighborhood of some line L whose
slope is 1, and V2(") consists of points lying above an "-neighborhood of the line L. It
remains to observe, which is a simple geometric exercise, that such a line L does not
exist for the setS in Example 1. However, if we slightly modify Example 1 so that the cost
of performing task 2 is c2 =2d +d p, then such a line L exists. 
Theorem 4 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Suppose A is a set of cardinality lower than the continuum. If S is a con-
nected subset of RA, then every incentive compatible SCF f : S ! A satisﬁes the revenue
equivalence property.
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